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Abstract 
This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature connected to the so called Porter 
Hypothesis. That is, to review the literature connected to the discussion about the relation 
between environmental policy and competitiveness. According to the conventional wisdom 
environmental policy, aiming for improving the environment through for example emission 
reductions, do imply costs since scarce resources must be diverted from somewhere else. 
However, this conventional wisdom has been challenged and questioned recently through 
what has been denoted the “Porter hypothesis”. Those in the forefront of the Porter hypothesis 
challenge the conventional wisdom basically on the ground that resources are used 
inefficiently in the absence of the right kind of environmental regulations, and that the 
conventional neo-classical view is too static to take inefficiencies into account. The 
conclusions that can be made from this review is (1) that the theoretical literature can identify 
the circumstances and mechanisms that must exist for a Porter effect to occur, (2) that these 
circumstances are rather non-general, hence rejecting the Porter hypothesis in general, (3) that 
the empirical literature give no general support for the Porter hypothesis. Furthermore, a 
closer look at the “Swedish case” reveals no support for the Porter hypothesis in spite of the 
fact that Swedish environmental policy the last 15-20 years seems to be in line the 
prerequisites stated by the Porter hypothesis concerning environmental policy. 
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 21. Introduction 
The fact that environmental problems have received increasing attention in recent years has 
led to an increased interest in the effects of different environmental policy measures. By 
"effects" we mean in part what governments want to achieve (i.e., a better environment), but 
also the effects on companies' efforts to succeed in an increasingly competitive world market. 
In other words, the interest in environmental policy issues is not only related to the "benefit 
side" but also the "cost side." The interest in the costs of environmental policy is especially 
salient in Sweden, and other similar countries that have made significant environmental 
progress, because further environmental improvements are assumed to be achieved at the 
expense of higher societal costs. The conventional wisdom is that strict environmental policy 
imposes costs for companies, which affects their competitiveness, and hence in the end have 
negative social economic impacts such as lower employment and welfare. However, this 
conventional wisdom has been challenged recently by proposing ideas and theories that see 
environmental policy as a possible "win-win" situation. Strongly connected to this increased 
interest and debate around environmental policy is, of course, the saliency of global warming. 
There seems to be a wide consensus that this issue must be dealt with on a large scale and that 
it is likely to require economic sacrifices of some type. Policy instruments and measures that 
can contribute to reducing the negative economic impact of fighting global warming is 
therefore of great relevance in the debate. 
It's important at this point to emphasize that regardless of whether a win-win situation is 
possible in today's environmental policies, all policy measures should be based on the value 
of environmental improvements. In other words, the absence of a win-win situation does not 
necessarily mean that we should avoid implementing environmental improvement policies. 
Rather, we should follow the traditional rule of thumb that a policy should be undertaken as 
long as the cost of an incremental emission reduction is lower than the incremental 
environmental improvement expected by the policy. The main question discussed in this 
paper is whether or not there may be an "extra profit" from an environmental regulation. If 
such extra profits do in fact exist, they should be considered in the benefit-cost calculation 
discussed above, which then will have consequences for what, and how much, measures that 
should be undertaken. For example, the absence of a win-win situation (e.g., "extra profit") 
does not necessarily mean we should avoid carbon dioxide emission reductions, given that 
such emissions lead to environmental damage. Rather, it means that we should set the 
emission level such that the marginal abatement cost equals the marginal benefit of emission 
 3reductions. Given a target set in this way, it can be achieved by, for example, setting a carbon 
dioxide tax equal to the marginal damage at this level. However, if there is an "extra profit" 
from the use of such a carbon dioxide tax, the conclusion is that the tax should be set at a level 
higher than the marginal damage.
3 Thus, the purpose of this report is to study the win-win 
hypothesis, i.e., whether there is reason to believe that some types of environmental policies 
in general may create the possibility of "extra profits." 
In the last 10 to 15 years the conventional thinking regarding the costs of environmental 
policies has been questioned and discussed in earnest. The discussion was inspired by the 
Harvard professor Michael Porter. Professor Porter's fundamental argument is put forth in an 
article in Scientific American in 1991. In it, he asserts that "strict environmental regulations do 
not inevitably hinder competitive advantage against foreign rivals." His argument was that 
more stringent environmental policies, if they are implemented correctly, can in fact lead to 
the opposite outcome: higher productivity, or a new comparative advantage, which can lead to 
improved competitiveness.
4 In other words, environmental policy can lead to a win-win 
situation, or an extra profit. Porter's ideas were developed in more detail in an article in the 
Journal of Economic Perspectives (Porter & van der Linde, 1995). In it, the authors developed 
two main reasons why "well-designed" environmental policies can lead to improved 
competitiveness. The first was that more stringent environmental regulations can put pressure 
on a company to become more efficient. According to Porter, "pressure" in the form of an 
environmental regulation can bring to light inefficiencies within firms that were previously 
hidden. The second was that more stringent regulations initiate innovation in companies. 
Taken together, these effects may lead not only to neutralizing the regulation's initial costs, 
but also to improving the company's competitive position. 
It is in light of these considerations that one should view the debate in for example Sweden 
regarding the country's desire to be at the forefront of environmental policy, i.e., to be the 
                                                 
3 The discussion about the possible benefits of environmental policy -- that is, whether or not a win-win situation 
is possible -- has a distinct similarity with the so called "double-dividend" idea behind an environment tax shift. 
In connection to that discussion a similar question applies; namely whether a rational argument exists for 
creating environmental policies that are more stringent than the environmental damage would otherwise justify. 
4 In his well-known book from 1990 "The Competitive Advantage of Nations" Porter notes that the traditional 
comparative advantage, or what he calls "inherited factors" such as large natural resource reserves, can be a 
hindrance to competitiveness. The "Dutch disease" may be an example of this, when the Netherlands discovered 
natural gas at the end of 1950s and beginning of the 1960s.  Gas exports increased which made the real exchange 
rate rise. The strong appreciation of the currency made it difficult for the other export sectors in the country. In a 
sense the “competitiveness” decreased (due to the change in exchange rate).  
 4"first mover." If Porter's assertion is correct, then there would seem to be a strong argument 
for, say, Sweden to gain a "first mover advantage" in regards to environmental policy - not 
only to ensure environmental protection, but also to improve their companies' competitive 
positions and therefore the country's well-being. 
Naturally, Porter's ideas are controversial; the reason is that they build on the assumption that 
a company itself is somehow unable to take economically beneficial measures on their own 
(see for example Palmer, Oates and Portney, 1995). According to Porter this occurs in part 
because companies are unable to find the most efficient way to produce or in part because 
they do not have the ability or capacity to make investment decisions that benefit the company 
in the long-term. Porter's ideas have inspired many to study the topic, both from a theoretical 
and empirical perspective. A fairly general consensus from the literature is that the Porter 
hypothesis can be supported in cases where there is a systematic lack of information, some 
type of limited, or bounded, rationality, or when the environmental regulation - as a side 
effect - either reduces or eliminates market imperfections within a sector. 
The main purpose of this paper is to summarize the state of knowledge surrounding 
environmental policy and competitiveness. The key question here is whether or not one can 
expect a Porter effect in general and, if so, which mechanisms are likely to be driving this 
effect. A related question is whether or not there are unique attributes of environmental 
regulations that make a Porter effect possible. In other words, why is it that all regulations in 
general do not display a Porter effect? 
More specifically, this paper aims to give a systematic review of the Porter hypothesis. The 
fundamental question is whether scientific evidence – theoretical and empirical - exists to 
support the hypothesis. If the hypothesis can be supported, does it only apply only within 
environmental policy? If evidence can be found to support the theory in general it would not 
only have wide-ranging effects for the development and design of social policy in general, but 
would also be a strong critique against the free market's ability to effectively allocate 
resources. 
The method in this paper builds on a literature review of the theoretical and empirical research 
in the field of economics. Treatments of the Porter hypothesis in other research fields are 
 5omitted for sake of limited space.
5 Furthermore, a closer look at the Swedish case is offered 
by reviewing some recent evidence. This is an interesting case since Sweden has been on the 
forefront with regulatory measures that seems to be in line with what Porter denotes “well-
designed” policy measures, e.g. the industry-wide CO2 tax which was introduced in 1991. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 provides a systematic assessment of 
what is meant by the Porter hypothesis. In many respects, the interpretation of the Porter 
hypothesis is based upon the neoclassical framework (the basis for this report), which means 
there may be alternative interpretations and aspects of the Porter hypothesis that are not 
captured here. Section 3 provides an overview of the current understanding in the literature 
with respect to the applicability and relevance of the Porter hypothesis. One of the objectives 
of this section is to address the main question of what is unique about environmental 
regulations and why only these types of regulations have the possibility of a "win-win" 
outcome. Section 4 concludes with a summary of what we know today and to what extent this 
information can provide guidance to environmental policy-makers. 
2. Envirionmental regulations and competiveness, what did 
Porter mean? 
A review of the literature reveals several interpretations of the Porter hypothesis, especially 
when it relates to the mechanisms assumed to be driving the connection between 
"competitiveness" and "environmental regulations." 
On a micro-level there seems to be two mechanisms for improving competitiveness: (1) 
product improvement and therefore higher product value and (2) process improvements - or 
productivity/efficiency improvements - and therefore lower costs. In principle both 
mechanisms can be directly related to the environmental regulation and/or be implemented 
via investment in new capital and/or investment in research and development (R&D). The 
focus of this paper will be primarily on the second mechanism, although the first mechanism 
will also be briefly discussed. 
A question related to the first mechanism (product improvement) is the extent to which 
                                                 
5 For example, the business and management literature contains a considerable amount of studies in connection 
with Porter’s hypothesis. 
 6environmental regulations generate "new growth" in the form of the "green sector" expansion. 
This question will not be explicitly addressed in the theoretical review that follows. However, 
in many empirical studies “product improvement” is implicitly included through changes in 
value added. Furthermore, the issue of an eventual expansion, or contraction, of the green 
sector is more or less an issue of pure structural change and has very little to do with the 
fundamental idea behind the Porter hypothesis. Environmental regulations will almost 
certainly lead to an expansion of the “green sector”, at least in the long run, but this will be 
balanced by a contraction in another sector in the economy. This is, of course, the whole point 
of environmental policy. Again, it is important to point out that the idea behind the Porter 
hypothesis is that environmental regulations generate an additional value above and beyond 
the positive environmental effects, which will manifest itself at least partially through a 
structural economic change. 
In addition, an analysis of the "product improvement" mechanism can be associated with 
several pitfalls if the purpose is to study the Porter effect described above. For example, in 
many cases environmental regulations are driven by changes in consumer preferences, i.e., 
consumers demand an environmentally-friendly product. A product improvement, or an 
entirely new product, that is the result of environmental regulations is therefore not 
necessarily the result of a company's improved innovation "post-regulation." Instead, it may 
simply be a change in consumer demand toward a new product that forces companies to 
change, or leads to the creation of new companies that take market share away from 
companies unable to adapt. Such a change would not be connected to the Porter effect, as 
depicted in this report.
6 
In conclusion it is worth noting that Porter's ideas may be considered new but when one 
reviews the argument in fine detail, large similarities begin to emerge with respect to the long-
running discussion around a company's pressure to transform itself. This entire discussion can 
be traced back to Schumpeter (1936).
7 According to this view, there is always pressure upon a 
company to transform and develop, but whether such transformation actually occurs depends 
on the type of "pressure" to which the company is subjected. Pressure to transform might 
manifest itself in the form of competitors, suppliers, or society (new regulations). The 
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7 See Roediger-Schluga (2004) for a discussion in relation to the Porter hypthesis.  
 7transformation that can occur may range from technical adaptation and product development 
to changes in leadership or organizational structure. 
As discussed in the introduction, the conventional understanding has been questioned, 
particularly by Michael Porter (Porter 1991; Porter and van der Linde, 1995). Porter asserts 
that more stringent environmental policies, if they are well-designed and implemented 
correctly, can in fact lead to the opposite outcome: higher productivity or a new comparative 
advantage of some type, which can lead to improved competitiveness. Thus, if we implement 
a more stringent environmental policy a la Porter then - assuming the measure has at least a 
positive effect on the environment - we need not worry about the impact on competitiveness. 
Put another way, as long as the regulation does not have a negative environmental impact, the 
measure should be implemented because it improves companies' competitiveness. 
Central to Porter's argument is that governments design and implement the "right type" of 
policy instrument. As Porter explains it: "Turning environmental concern into competitive 
advantage demands that we establish the right kind of regulations” (Porter (1991), p. 168). 
According to Porter ”the right kind of regulation” results in ”a process that not only pollutes 
less but lowers cost or improves quality.” Specifically "the right kind of regulation" is an 
instrument that leads to new technical solutions and innovation, which in turn leads to 
improved resource allocation.  
Well-designed regulations, according to Porter, serve several purposes. First, regulations act 
as a signal that efficiency gains and technological improvements are possible. In the absence 
of an environmental regulation, companies are unaware of their own ecological impact, as 
well as potential efficiency improvements and the potential for innovations. According to 
Porter, regulations are aimed to visualize the ecological impact as well as potential 
technological and technical process innovations. Second, regulations can contribute toward a 
company's increased environmental awareness. Environmental regulations are often 
implemented in conjunction with regular reporting requirements where a company must 
report their emissions. This transparency in a company's environmental impacts is meant not 
only for the public, says Porter, but for the company itself. The third argument for well-
designed regulations is that they reduce the uncertainty that is associated with many types of 
investments. This argument assumes that environmental policies will be consistently 
implemented over a long time period. The fourth argument, according to Porter, is that 
regulations contribute to an improved environmental awareness in general, which affects 
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their products in order to survive.  
To give a picture of the dynamics involved in the hypothesis, Porter and van der Linde 
assume that the innovations generated by environmental regulations can be divided into two 
broad categories. First, companies become more adept at handling pollution in the sense that 
they improve their handling of waste and their use of input factors that cause environmental 
damage. According to Porter, innovations and investments that target these aspects reduce the 
company's environmental adaptation costs. The other type of innovation arises when a 
company simultaneously considers the regulation and a production-process improvement, a 
product improvement, or even an entirely new product. The latter adaptation is the basis for 
the Porter hypothesis because it explains the mechanism that makes it possible not only to 
reduce the company's costs, but to neutralize them completely, and even generate "extra 
profits."  
Porter divides the possibility for cost neutralization into the product and process mechanisms. 
The former arises when environmental regulations not only reduce pollution, but also improve 
the product's quality and performance, which leads to a higher product price. The latter arises 
when an environmental regulation not only leads to reduced pollution, but to improved 
productivity/efficiency, i.e., increased output for a given quantity of input.  
Porter and van der Linde point to many other possibilities, including selling by-products 
(which were previously considered waste) as inputs for the production of other goods. 
Alternatively, the authors note the possibility to reduce process costs by reducing energy use 
or costs associated with inventory, etc. 
As noted above one of the arguments for environmental regulation is the increase in general 
environmental awareness that can, among other things, mean an increased willingness to pay 
for "green" products, thus leading to new products and markets. Porter and van der Linde 
point to an interesting Swedish example of product improvement in the Scandinavian pulp 
and paper industry. The producers in this sector promoted and introduced new 
environmentally-friendly processes. This development allowed the suppliers that designed the 
technology - Kamry (now Kvaerner Pulping) and Sunds Defibrator - to win greater 
international market share in their sales of paper-bleaching technology. Porter's interpretation 
is that these suppliers were forced to adapt to the Scandinavian pulp and paper industry's new 
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processes increased, the Swedish suppliers had already developed the product.  
The above case study is what Porter refers to as the "first mover advantage." In other words 
the regulated company is not the only entity that can experience improved competitiveness; 
rather, the positive effects can even spread down the supply chain. As Porter points out, the 
Swedish pulp and paper industry example assumes that environmental regulations are 
consistent with the international trend for environmental protection.
8 
What conditions and principles must be met in order for environmental regulations to have 
maximum positive effect? The first, according to Porter, is to create an environment where 
companies can be innovative and new processes can be shared among the regulated industry. 
Furthermore, the regulations must generate a continuous process for innovation such that no 
specific technology is preserved or protected (patented). Last, but not least, industry should be 
released from the uncertainty that is often connected to environmental policy and the 
associated requirements for environmental investment. In other words, Porter states that 
regulations should be driven by results, not methods; rather than targeting specific 
technological changes, regulations should integrate economic incentives such as 
environmental taxes/fees, environmental deposits, and transferrable emission permits. 
In summary, Porter does not make the assertion that all environmental regulation leads to 
improved competitiveness; instead his argument is that well-designed environmental policy 
can be more conducive to improved competitiveness. According to Porter, well-designed 
environmental policy: 
  must be preventative 
  must not be based on prescriptive (quantitative) technology 
  must be based on a structure of market incentives 
The complete cost neutralization that can arise from "well-designed" environmental 
regulation has been referred to as "a strong Porter effect" (see for example de Vries and 
Withagen, 2005). If, instead, a well-designed environmental regulation not leads to complete 
cost neutralization, but rather to a cost outcome that is lower than the second best regulatory 
alternative, it is generally referred to as a "weak Porter effect." However, it should be clearly 
                                                 
8 See also the discussion in Porter (1990) regarding "clusters" and "Porter's Diamond." 
 10noted that the existence of a "weak Porter effect" does not imply a cost-free environmental 
policy; rather the choice of an alternative instrument to fulfill the same policy would have led 
to a higher cost. 
Figure 2.1 is an attempt to illustrate and summarize some aspects of the Porter effects 
discussed above. The top Figure (a) illustrates the conventional, or traditional, effect of a 
regulation. For simplicity we assume that a good, q, is produced with one input factor that 
generates emissions of some pollutant, z. In other words, increased production necessarily 
brings increased emissions (if firms are on the production possibility frontier). The connection 
between production and emissions is described by the production function (z), where 0 
indicates the pre-regulation level of technology. A profit-maximizing firm in the pre-
regulation period chooses to produce q
0 units, which leads to an emissions level of z
0. This 
means that the company utilizes the existing technology to its maximum potential and 
produces in the most efficient manner, given the assumptions mentioned above. A regulation 
that limits emissions to z
R by definition limits the company's options, or choice set, which 





R. This scenario provides improved competitiveness for companies located 
in other countries that are not subject to the same regulations. 
The lower Figure (b) attempts to illustrate some of the effects that arise according to the 
Porter hypothesis. According to Porter, a regulation will highlight inefficiencies in a 
company. One way to illustrate this in the pre-regulation period is to assume that a company 
is not producing on the production possibilities frontier but rather at point C. A regulation of 
emissions from z
0 to z
R would highlight inefficiencies which would allow the company to 
move (outward) to the production possibilities curve. At point B all inefficiencies are 
neutralized and the company increases production (from q
0 to q
R), earns higher profits (from 

0 to 
R) and, at the same time, reduces emissions. The hypothesis assumes implicitly that it is 
cost-free to move toward the frontier. There could, of course, be several reasons why a 
company might not be producing as efficiently as it could. There is empirical evidence to 
support the idea that some companies do not always choose energy investments that 
maximize profits. For example, the US Environmental Protection Agency recognized this and 
introduced the "Green Lights Program" which provides companies information and advice on 



































Figure 2.1. The Porter hypothesis 
According to the Porter hypothesis, environmental regulations have a "dynamic" effect in that 
they stimulate innovation and new processes. Figure 2.1b illustrates this by showing how the 
"frontier" (production possibilities curve) shifts upward and represents a "new" technology 
R(z). The new production technology means that the production and emission levels at point 
B are inefficient, but the regulations make this inefficiency visible to the company. 
Ultimately, this means the company will move itself from point C to B and then move even 
further as a result of the new technology to a point between D and E. Given stable prices (in 
both the product itself and the "emissions" input), profit is maximized at point E. Even in this 
part of the Porter hypothesis the implicit assumption is that the development of the new 
technology does not make us of the company's productive resources, or at least are very small. 
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can be rejected. In order to verify the hypothesis Porter and van der Linde provide several 
examples in the form of case studies. One example from the company Raytheon shows how 
regulation-generated innovation often refers to improvements in product performance or 
quality. The company introduced a program to eliminate all ozone-depleting 
chlorofluorocarbons (Freon), which were used for cleaning delicate electronic circuit-boards. 
Raytheon now introduced a new environmental friendly method based on water, turpentine, 
and most importantly, recycling. The new process improved the average product quality 
compared with the previous process. The authors asserted that this new process would not 
have been possible in the absence of environmental policy.  
Another example of cost neutralization that Porter points to is the measures undertaken by the 
jewelry manufacturer Robbins Company. The company converted to a closed-loop "zero-
discharge" waste system that completely eliminated the release of polluted spill water. The 
new process resulted in spill water that was 40 times cleaner than household tap water. The 
outcome was a more effective plating system that resulted in higher product quality and fewer 
product re-calls. 
Porter and van der Linde (1995) give several other examples to which we refer the interested 
reader. Our review of the empirical evidence generates two interesting questions: First, does 
the empirical evidence support the hypothesis in general, or simply support these particular 
case studies? Second, and perhaps even more important, are these case studies the rule or the 
exception? 
It is nearly impossible to answer the first question without going into the detail of each and 
every case. The actual evidence that the regulation itself was responsible for making these 
inefficiencies "visible" to the company cannot be documented. However, it's also not possible 
to conclude that many of the measures would have been implemented for purely economic 
reasons, even in the absence of the regulations. Regarding the second question, there does not 
appear to be a certain answer there either. There were very few companies investigated and, 
as Palmer et al. (1995) suggest, "It would be an easy matter for us to assemble a matching list 
where firms have found their costs increased and profits reduced as a result of environmental 
regulations, not to mention cases where regulation has pushed firms over the brink into 
bankruptcy” (Palmer et al. 1995, p. 121). It is certainly possible that the companies to which 
Porter and van der Linde (1995) refer could have experienced positive economic impacts. The 
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A policy that is based only on the "positive" examples may underestimate the regulation's true 
cost, which ultimately results in a level of regulation where the social costs and benefits are 
not in balance. 
Thus, an interesting and important question is whether we can find any systematic connection 
between environmental regulations and competitiveness. The previous discussion provides 
some guidance on how to investigate this issue. The theory on comparative advantage says 
that the development of a country's net exports depends upon the development of the country's 
comparative advantage. In theory one can separate out the real effects of regulation on a 
company's competitiveness by studying, for example, the effects on the country's net exports 
given that real wages and exchanges rates are held constant. However, in practice it is very 
difficult, although maybe not impossible, to separate out the environmental effects from all 
other effects. The best approach would be to study the effects of environmental regulations 
before the exchange rate adjusts and therefore also before the net exports of non-regulated 
goods adjusts. This is a significant problem in most empirical studies. Therefore most studies 
rely on indirect indicators to measure the effect of regulations on a company's 
competitiveness, rather than considering the adjustment mechanism itself such as the 
exchange rate. Besides net exports, other indicators have also been studied (e.g., the country 
in which the pollution-intensive good is produced and whether the international trading 
patterns have changed over time). 
A more direct method - and one that is more in line with Porter's original idea - is to study the 
environmental regulation's effects according to the illustration in Figure 2.1. That is, study the 
development of productivity in a company, a sector, or an entire country. This approach has 
several advantages. First, a change in competitiveness must sooner or later affect production. 
Second, it is possible - at least theoretically - to divide the productivity change into an 
efficiency and technological component. However, one should be aware of the fact that this 
does not enable a hypothesis test of a "strong Porter effect." In other words, even if one finds 
that more stringent environmental regulations lead to increased productivity via an efficiency 
improvement and/or technological advance, it does not directly support the idea that this 
would (at least) neutralize the company's cost of the environmental regulation. What can be 
said, however, is that the company has become more efficient (more productive) and the cost 
of reaching this environmental goal was lower than what it would have been if no efficiency 
improvements had been undertaken. 
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is provided in the next section. Included in this is a discussion of the concepts that are central 
to the Porter hypothesis, as well as the arguments in favor and against the hypothesis.  
3. What are the arguments, a review of the literature 
The objective with this section is to review the theoretical as well as the empirical literature 
that is relevant for the objective with this paper. An attempt will be made to present a 
systematic review, considering different aspects of the Porter hypothesis, such as regulatory 
effects on (i) R&D, (ii) investment, (iii) productivity/efficiency, and (iv) costs and profits. 
The objective here is to cover the most relevant theory and empirics given the main purpose 
of this paper. The review is most likely not complete, but hopefully covers the most important 
elements and arguments. The Porter hypothesis is a type of "win-win" hypothesis. 
Importantly, a "win-win" situation can arise due to a number of reasons other than what Porter 
discusses, but this brings us into other research areas that will not be addressed in this paper. 
One example of a research area not covered here is the theory and empirics around a tax shift 
and the resulting "double dividend." Another area is the theory and empirics around 
endogenous growth, the diffusion of technology and so-called spillovers. The work from these 
more general research areas will be highlighted only to the extent that they have a direct and 
relevant connection to the Porter hypothesis. 
3.1 Theory 
As mentioned above the academic debate around the Porter hypothesis started soon after 
Michael Porter's original article in Scientific American in 1991, but gathered steam following 
the publication of two articles in the Journal of Economic Perspectives in 1995. The first 
article by Porter and van der Linde (1995) further developed the ideas from Porter (1991), 
while the second article by Palmer et al. (1995) argued strongly against these ideas. Using a 
relatively simple model Palmer et al. (1995) argued that the Porter hypothesis simply was not 
plausible. Moreover, they asserted that the empirical evidence that Porter and van der Linde 
point to consists of only a few examples of companies that benefitted from regulation or for 
some other reason were successful, but failed to identify the other companies that were 
harmed by environmental regulation. 
Porter's argument rests in large part on the assumption that the traditional neoclassic 
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too static. Porter and van der Linde (1995) points out that one must have a more dynamic 
view of the effects of environmental regulation. The fundamental theory behind their 
argument finds its roots in Michael Porter's earlier work in 1990 related to companies' 
dynamic change. Porter (1990) states that long-term sustainable economic growth cannot be 
built upon what he calls a country's "inherited factors of production" (labor, natural resources, 
etc) which, in the neoclassical theory, is assumed to determine a country's comparative 
advantage. Porter even makes the claim that a lot of these "inherited factors of production" 
can lead to a competitive disadvantage. In the so-called Diamond Model, Porter emphasizes 
that competition and rivalry between competitors, as well as proximity to customers and 
suppliers are the driving factors in a dynamic process. Clustering, or proximity to each other, 
is the key to competitiveness according to Porter. Efficiency improvements can thus very 
quickly be shared with customers and suppliers, which increase the dynamics. The State's role 
in Porter's Diamond Model can be viewed as a driver of the process through "the carrot and 
the stick." An example of this type of dynamic cluster-environment according to Porter is 
Silicon Valley. Another example might be the Swedish pulp and paper industry, discussed 
above, which includes not only paper companies but also suppliers and technical companies 
with an orientation toward industrial processes. 
Porter and van der Linde (1995) simply transfer these theories to the environmental policy 
arena by assuming that the State can create pressure for innovation and change through 
environmental regulations. Two weaknesses to this approach can be identified directly. The 
first is that Porter's competitive model is built upon the cluster idea, i.e., in order to establish a 
business climate that thrives on the dynamic processes that Porter describes, the companies - 
including everybody from their customers to their suppliers - must be grouped together at a 
specific geographical place. What is actually meant by this is not exactly clear. Thus, the 
question that arises from an environmental perspective is what kind of effects that are 
expected when environmental regulations are applied to companies that are spread over a 
large area rather than at a specific place. Another potential weakness in the theory is that the 
dynamic process seems to occur independent of "the sticks and carrots" used by the State. In 
other words the State's key role is to be the entity that applies the pressure, but the type of 
pressure it applies seems to be of secondary importance. The only reasonable interpretation is 
that any other means of applying pressure on companies could ostensibly bring about Porter's 
dynamic process and also lead to improved competitiveness.  
 16The view on "dynamics" appears to be one of the main differences between the Porter 
perspective and the neoclassical view put forward by Palmer et al. (1995). They, however, 
point to two other fundamental differences. The first is that Porter assumes that the private 
sector systematically fails to capitalize on all profitable opportunities. The second is that the 
Porter hypothesis is based on the assumption that the State (or other regulatory authority 
outside of the private sector) is not only in a position to observe the inefficiencies of the 
private sector, but can even correct for such inefficiencies. Porter assumes, in other words, 
that the regulator are a more informed actor in the market place and, moreover, are in a 
position to implement measures to encourage companies to neutralize their inefficiencies. 
Palmet et al. find this view " ... hard to swallow." A general question that arises - which in 
fact was posed by Palmer et al - is whether or not Porter's hypothesis about government 
regulations applies in general, or if there is something unique about environmental policy?  
The arguments expressed in Palmer et al. helped to "jump-start" a new theoretical and 
empirical research area focusing the connection between environmental regulations and 
competitiveness. The theoretical literature has to a large extent searched for the mechanisms 
and circumstances that might lead to the effects that Porter describes. The explanatory models 
that have been developed so far can be roughly categorized as either (1) models that focus on 
the diffusion of technological innovations and positive externalities associated with research 
and development (R&D) in the environmental arena; (2) models based on imperfect markets 
and strategic interaction; and (3) models based on the idea that companies may not act 
rationally due to problems of coordination associated with internal decision-making (Gabel 
and Sinclair-Desgagné, 1998, 2001);. Theories within (1) and (2) rests predominantly on neo-
classical theory, while (3) fits better within the Porter framework that focuses on a company's 
internal dynamics and how pressure from "without" can facilitate change "within."
9 
Examples of models and theories in the first group - positive externalities and the diffusion of 
technology - are given in Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999), Mohr (2002) and Feichtinger et 
al. (2005). A related explanatory model (simulation model) is given in Popp (2005), which 
builds upon the result that investment in R&D is uncertain. 
Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999) build their explanatory model on two key assumptions. 
                                                 
9 This branch of theory can potentially be connected to bounded rationality (see e.g. Simon, 1982). We discuss 
this further in the concluding section in relation to thoughts on future research. 
 17First, they assume two companies: a domestic company that is regulated (environmental tax) 
and a foreign company that is not regulated. Because there are only two companies, their 
individual decisions regarding production affect the market price for their good (the good is 
demanded in a "third country"). Second, they assume that each company's machinery (capital 
stock) is of variable age, where the newer machines are not only more productive than the 
older machines, but also less polluting. Further, they assume that the companies have the 
possibility to invest in newer machinery, but at a cost. Given these assumptions, it is not 
possible to demonstrate a "strong Porter effect" but the conflict between competitiveness and 
environmental regulation is not necessarily as significant as one might think. In principle 
there are two mechanisms that lessen the supposed contradiction. The first is that it can be 
relatively profitable to invest in the newer less-polluting capital due to the improved 
productivity. However, investment comes at a cost and the so-called "capital composition 
effect" is not sufficient to neutralize the initial cost increase. However, the initial cost increase 
has a "scale effect" which in this case works for the Porter hypothesis. The higher costs 
actually mean that the domestic regulated company reduces its capital stock in absolute terms, 
thus decreasing production. It is here that the first assumption plays a decisive role. The first 
assumption means that the company faces a downward-sloping demand curve. Thus, the 
decrease in production causes the market price to rise. The net effect of the increasing market 
price, together with the positive production effect driven by the new capital investment, 
dampens the decline in profits. As the authors note, the strength in this dampening effect 
depends upon the modernization of the capital stock as well as the "scale effect" via the 
higher market price. 
Simpson and Bradford (1996) generated a result where the domestic regulated company 
obtains a higher profit then the non-regulated foreign company, but their strategic model 
(duopoly) relies on several very specific assumptions. The authors themselves note that "In 
our model we find that this [domestic industrial advantage] may be a theoretical possibility, 
but that it is extremely dubious as practical advice” (p. 296, Simpson and Bradford, 1996). 
In summary, we can say that both of these models demonstrate that under special 
circumstances a "strong Porter effect" may almost arise. However, relatively small changes in 
assumptions lead to radical changes in results, which then do not give any clear support for a 
Porter effect in general. Perhaps even more important is that the results are not unique to the 
case of environmental regulations, as both studies point out. The studies note that the same 
results could be reached through an industrial policy in general that focuses on R&D and new 
 18technology. For example, there is a strong argument that direct subsidies to R&D are a 
superior instrument in cases involving positive externalities associated with R&D. This is 
consistent with fundamental economic theory as well as the empirical evidence; i.e., we 
should tax negative external effects and subsidize positive external effects. In some cases we 
may observe ex post that an environmental regulation has helped to correct other externalities, 
but this does not mean that one can base a policy on this effect ex ante. Simpson and Bradford 
go so far in their critique (even in their own model) to completely dismiss the idea that more 
stringent environmental regulations can provide benefits to competitiveness. Their argument, 
in many ways, is that the Porter effect arises only under very special assumptions - which 
admittedly may be adequate and reasonable in some specific cases - but rarely as a general 
rule. For example several of the models where the actors act strategically may predict a Porter 
effect, but it is independent of the "scale effect" of the type described in Xepapadeas and de 
Zeeuw (1999). Thus, even if there was some type of "first mover advantage" it is, by 
definition, only temporary because the higher price will entice new producers to enter the 
market. 
In contrast to Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999), Mohr (2002) shows that a "strong Porter 
effect" is possible under assumptions that are similar to those discussed above. Besides the 
assumptions that newer machines are more environmentally-friendly and more productive, 
Mohr also assumes that there are several companies and that there exists positive external 
economy of scale in the sense that the productivity within a company that applies a specific 
type of technology depends upon the collective "experience" of using that type of capital. In 
other words, there is a "learning effect". The implications of this assumption are obvious. 
Assume that a company uses "old" capital, which is used by many other companies. Even 
though the capital is "old", it is relatively productive due to "the learning effect." Assume 
further that a new type of capital becomes available and that this new capital is fundamentally 
more productive. The problem is that now there is a disadvantage of being the "first mover" in 
the sense of investing in the new technology. All companies prefer to wait until others have 
invested in order to avoid incurring the "learning costs." In other words "it costs money to be 
on top" or, to use the more prevalent terminology, there is a "second mover advantage." In 
simple terms this implies that it is profitable to wait until others have invested and then 
benefit from the experience that they gain. It is also evident that there are positive 
externalities of investment because other companies can benefit - without paying - from the 
experience that arises when other companies invest in the new technology. The positive 
 19externalities mean that the actual investments made within a sector may be non-optimal from 
a social perspective, which in turn provides a rationale for some type of policy intervention. 
Mohr (2002) shows that if the State introduces a policy that forces all companies to use a new 
technology, and simultaneously introduces a restriction that companies must reduce 
emissions, then production will fall in the short-term, but increase in the long-term.
10 The 
same result is reached if the new technology is subsidized.
11 
According to Mohr (2002) a Porter effect is possible if one allows for the possibility for a 
technological change that also leads to positive external effects. If we interpret the Porter 
effect as a simultaneous increase in production and decrease in emissions, then we can be 
even more specific and say that Mohr's analysis identifies the circumstances, or policies, 
under which this type of effect may arise. However, one cannot say that such a policy in fact 
will lead to a Porter effect, i.e., reduced environmental impacts and increased production. 
Essentially, it is not possible to exclude the possibility that a policy aimed at stimulating more 
productive technology can lead to both increased production and increased emissions. It 
means that an optimal policy is not necessarily a policy that leads to increased production and 
reduced emissions. In sum, the analysis in Mohr (2002) shows that environmental regulations 
can lead to increased productivity (efficiency) as well as increased production and profits. The 
driving factor is the positive externalities associated with investment in new technology via 
the "learning effect." 
Thus, an environmental policy that stimulates, or forces, the implementation of a new 
technology can be justified. However, it should be emphasized once again that productivity 
effects are not unique to environmental regulations but rather are generally applicable as long 
as there is some form of positive externalities associated with the increased capital use and/or 
change in capital composition. 
The conclusion that can perhaps be drawn from the latter is that even if positive "learning 
effects" are likely this does not justify the introduction of a regulation (environmental tax or 
quantitative regulation) that is more stringent than what is justified from an environmental 
                                                 
10 By "long-term" we mean the time it takes to reach the same or greater level of experience with the new 
technology that had already been in play with the old technology. 
11 Another possible intervention could be to tax production that relies on the old technology. 
 20perspective. Instead one should implement an industrial policy that benefits, or gives 
incentives for, investment in the new technology.
12 Subsidies to have in part been justified by 
this type of argument, i.e., a learning effect (Mohr, 2002, however, does not give any explicit 
argument for subsidizing wind power
13). His analysis gives further support to the idea of 
eliminating uncertainty around environmental policy. Once again wind power can act as a 
prime example. As shown in Michanek and Söderholm (2006) there may be a value for a 
company to wait to invest in wind power if there is uncertainty associated with the existing 
subsidy systems, as there is now in Sweden. Furthermore, if there are learning effects 
associated with this behavior, as discussed above, the effects of uncertainty can be worsen by 
causing otherwise socially-profitable investments to be postponed. 
Feichtinger et al (2005) essentially draw the same conclusions as Mohr with respect to the 
effects of optimal policy. In a generalized version of Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999) they 
show that if one has a modernizing effect, as in Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999), and a 
learning effect of the type discussed in Mohr (2002), the emissions reduction effect becomes 
lower. Feichtinger et al. (2005) show that a learning effect can negatively strengthen the 
decline in profits for a policy designed to reach a specific environmental goal. The reason for 
this, expressed in simple terms, is that the environmental tax level must be increased more in 
the case of learning effects in order to off-set the emissions increase driven by the higher 
productivity. Overall, we can say that the three studies referred to above do not give any 
definitive answers to the questions of what conditions that must prevail in order to see a 
Porter effect, and to the question of what may be unique about an environmental regulation, 
viewed from the Porter perspective. Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999) show that under their 
specific assumptions a weak Porter effect associated with an environmental regulation 
(environmental tax) can arise. In this case "weak" refers to the fact that the negative effects of 
a "forced modernization" are dampened to some degree predominantly by the increase in the 
price of the good they are producing. This price increase assumption follows naturally from 
the duopoly model the authors employ (i.e., two companies produce the same good). In other 
words, the Porter effect is entirely dependent on this price effect or, in more general terms, is 
                                                 
12 Jaffe et al. (2005) supports this conclusion, but also note that one should have a long-term strategy that tests 
different policy options; above all these options should be valued systematically. 
13 Michanek and Söderholm (2006) show that there is significant uncertainty associated with investment in wind 
power. This uncertainty is associated primarily with uncertainty around the future support (state subsidies) and 
the market conditions that may arise over the long-term and, above all, on the permitting process. 
 21entirely dependent upon the assumptions regarding the type of market within which a 
company operates. Mohr shows that a productivity effect can be strengthened by the existence 
of a "learning effect." Thus, a more stringent environmental policy may in fact benefit 
companies, but the eventual emissions reduction is presumably reduced relative to the original 
target because emissions will likely increase even further in the second stage. Thus, as shown 
in Feichtinger et al. (2005), if a specific emission target is to be reached, the more likely it is 
that companies' profits will ultimately decline, which discredits the Porter effect.
14  
Perhaps the most important conclusion from these three studies is that the effects that may 
possibly arise are in no way unique to environmental regulations; instead, they can arise from 
other types of regulations. This points clearly to the idea that if one's objective is to realize 
profits from improved productivity as a result of positive externalities, then it is presumably 
more effective to implement a more general industrial policy that is not necessarily aimed at 
environmental investments.  Further, one can draw the conclusion that if learning effects of 
the type discussed above are prevalent in an industry or sector, there is no "first mover 
advantage." Instead, it is more profitable to wait until others have invested in the newer 
technology. The effect of another type of externality is studied in Greaker (2006). The idea 
here is that environmental regulations give rise to a new industry: suppliers of pollution 
abatement equipment. A more stringent environmental policy implies an increasing demand 
for such equipment, which in turn means that the companies that supply this equipment no 
longer need as big price premium as before to cover the costs to develop this kind of 
equipment. The model used in Greaker (2006) consists of three actors: an "upstream" 
company that produces the abatement equipment, a "downstream" company that pollutes and 
produces a good on the world market, and the government (regulator) that determines 
environmental policy. Given these assumptions, a more stringent environmental policy leads 
to increased demand for pollution abatement equipment, which attracts several potential 
producers of this equipment, which in turn reduces the development costs in this industry. The 
result is that the price of the abatement equipment falls. A direct effect of the more stringent 
environmental regulation is that the costs for the exporting (downstream) company increases, 
but this effect is opposed in the model by the fact that the price of pollution abatement 
equipment falls, which can completely neutralize the direct effects. A necessary condition to 
                                                 
14 The reason is that if a, say, tax, is introduced and this also affects productivity in a positive way, production 
will increase, and hence emissions. This demands even further regulations, in order to reach the target. 
 22ensure the positive neutralizing effect is that the price of the pollution abatement equipment 
falls as a consequence of the more stringent environmental regulation. However, this is not a 
sufficient condition; instead a number of rather technical conditions must also be fulfilled. 
Overall it is interesting that this type of up/downstream model can lead to a Porter effect. 
Even if the model's assumptions in some cases may be adequate, it is still difficult to draw 
some more general policy conclusions. For example, it is assumed that the export company 
acts on a world market and is a price-taker. At the same time it is assumed that the upstream 
company that develops and supplies pollution abatement equipment is exposed to relatively 
little competition and does not operate on the world market. This may be a reasonable 
assumption at the very beginning of the regulatory process. However, it is difficult to argue 
for this assumption to hold true in a longer time perspective. Thus, there might be some type 
of "first-mover advantage", but this benefit is likely short-lived. If the competitor’s is also 
eventually regulated, or perhaps requires new equipment for some other reason, they can also 
benefit from this type of development because it ultimately leads to lower costs for them. 
Thus, the price of the good traded on the world market will fall and neutralize the "home 
country's" initial competitive advantage. Despite this criticism, one policy conclusion that can 
be drawn from the Greaker-study is that politicians should not be afraid to take steps toward 
needed environmental regulations because the costs might not be as large as they initially 
thought. 
Finally, it is worth noting a study by Popp (2005), whose model is significantly different than 
those discussed above. Popp's model has no strategic connection or imperfections of the type 
discussed above; instead, it is built on the fundamental assumption that the result of an R&D 
project is uncertain. It is a simulation model where a company is exposed to an environmental 
regulation that requires lower emissions in period 1. The company can reduce the use of the 
"dirty" input or spend money on an R&D project. However, the company does not know ex 
ante with certainty which of the alternative projects will be profitable. The company chooses 
to invest only if the expected profit of an R&D alternative is higher than the profits in the next 
best alternative. The result of the simulation shows that ex post an R&D project can lead to a 
complete neutralization of the environmental regulation's cost. However, the results show that 
an incomplete neutralization is more common. Popp asserts that this uncertainty can explain 
why some studies, or case studies, have found complete neutralization of costs, but that even 
more studies have shown that the costs are not neutralized. Popp's analysis shows the clear 
problem with relying on case studies of the type provided in Porter and van der Linde. The 
 23policy conclusion he draws is that "While induced innovation can lower the cost of complying 
with environmental regulation, policymakers should not expect such innovations to 
completely eliminate these costs.” (Popp, 2005, p. 10).  
The theoretical review above shows that there is no consensus around the costs of 
environmental regulation. As noted, the effects of environmental regulations are strongly 
dependent upon the assumptions made. A relatively robust, or in this case relatively common, 
result is that there must be some form of market imperfection - above and beyond any 
environmental problem - that is met with some sort of "negative correction" in the form of a 
regulation designed to correct the environmental problem. In simple terms it seems that a 
Porter effect requires that (1) there must be two problems and (2) that they can be addressed 
with one measure; to use a crude analogy we must be able to "kill two birds with one stone." 
This gives rise to two fundamental questions: First, is whether or not this type of positive 
connection between two different external effects is common? Second, can a regulator know 
ex ante when such a situation is present? The general answer to the first question is that this 
type of connection rarely exists. The answer to the second question is that the regulator is 
presumably unaware of this information ex ante; instead the policy must be implemented in 
order to get the answer ex post. Even if this "extra" positive effect from the environmental 
regulation would arise - i.e., that an environmental regulation corrects for other market 
imperfections - several studies have shown this is not a sufficient condition. That is, even if 
environmental regulations allow for positive externalities associated with technological 
development, it is not certain that we obtain a "strong Porter effect" simply because the new 
technology is costly.  
In conclusion we can only say that the theory trying to rationalize the Porter hypothesis can 
identify mechanisms that are central in the Porter discussion and how different assumptions 
affect these mechanisms. From this literature we can draw the robust conclusion that very 
specific circumstances are required in order to say that the costs of more stringent 
environmental regulations can be completely neutralized. Another conclusion is that any 
eventual cost neutralizing - even if it is not complete - is not unique to environmental 
regulations. 
Even if theory can give us knowledge about the important mechanisms, we cannot really 
answer these questions until we join theory with reality, which we do in the next section. 
 243.2 Empirics 
The purpose of this section is to give a summary overview of the empirical research related to 
the Porter hypothesis. The empirical studies we review are listed and briefly described in 
tables 3.1 through 3.3 in the Appendix. 
There is an extensive empirical literature related to the connection between competitiveness 
and environmental regulations.
15 However, it should be pointed out that explicit tests of a 
“strong Porter effect” are rare. By "strong" we mean at least complete cost neutralization. 
Several of the studies test individual parts of the Porter hypothesis without actually making a 
clear distinction between the weak and strong forms. The aspect of the Porter hypothesis most 
subjected to empirical research is environmental regulation's effects on innovation and R&D, 
investment, and productivity. In the somewhat older literature one can find an extensive 
literature around regulation's effects on trade (see Jaffe et al., 1995).  
Before we go further, we should be clear about the difficulties that arise when testing the 
Porter hypothesis. As we already mentioned several times, the Porter hypothesis does not 
state that competitiveness increases as a result of any or all regulation; instead Porter and van 
der Linde assert that environmental regulation must be well-designed. Most people - 
including the authors of this study - interpret "well-designed" to mean economic instruments 
in the form of taxes and transferrable permits. However this distinction is rarely made in the 
empirical literature. Instead, most studies completely remove any reference to the type of 
instrument underlying the regulation. Reasons for this may be the lack of data and/or the 
difficulty of defining and measuring the strength of an environmental regulation. Another 
reason is that environmental taxes and transferrable permits have a relatively short history and 
are not extensively used. 
In an earlier review of the literature focusing on regulations' effects on trade, Jaffe et al. 
(1995) conclude that in general there does not exist any strong evidence that environmental 
regulations have especially large and/or negative consequences on a company's 
competitiveness, given that competitiveness is measured as changes in trade. The studies 
referred to by the authors have analyzed the effects on net exports, the decision of where to 
                                                 
15 As already noted there are a number of research overviews of the Porter hypothesis (see e.g. Marklund, 1997; 
Mulatu, 2001; Wagner, 2003; Lundgren 2004; Ambec and Barla, 2006). 
 25locate production, and the flow of trade. The overall conclusion is that the effects are either 
small or insignificant.
16 
Jaffe et al. (1995) make reference to, among others, Kalt (1988) as one of the first studies to 
examine the connection between regulations and competitiveness. Kalt (1988) used a 
relatively traditional econometric trade model where he added an independent variable that 
represented the costs incurred by regulated industries. A conclusion was that environmental 
regulations had a negative effect on the US's trade development in the period 1967 to 1977 
when examining the manufacturing industry. Remarkably enough, this result was strengthen 
when the chemical industry was excluded. A more reasonable result might have been that the 
negative effects had weakened when the chemical industry was removed, since it is a sector 
with well-known environmental impacts. One interpretation could be that there is some form 
of Porter effect within the chemical industry. Another interpretation is that the chemical 
industry is extremely heterogeneous and even includes the pharmaceutical industry, which has 
reaped large benefits associated with trade.  
Another older study of trading behavior was conducted by Low and Yeats (1992). They found 
that between 1965 and 1988 the percentage of pollution-intensive goods in world trade fell 
from 19 to 16 percent and that developing countries developed their comparative advantage in 
these products at a faster pace than industrialized countries. Jaffe et al. (1995) suggests that 
these results should be interpreted with some caution. It is possible that people in developing 
countries simply increased their demand for these types of products during the study period. 
Another explanation that was put forth and has wide empirical support is simply that trading 
behavior depends in part, or entirely, on natural resource supplies. This discussion and the 
possible explanations illustrates, to some extent, the difficulty of interpreting the results from 
these types of indirect models, particularly if the goal is to use the results to better understand 
the effect of environmental regulation on competitiveness. 
Jaffe et al. (1995) also refer to other studies that focus on the flow of investment between 
countries. These studies are, however, of a more general character and do not look specifically 
at environmental regulations. Wheeler and Mody (1992), for example found no connection 
between foreign direct investment and taxes on companies. They assert that many other 
factors dominate over the effects of taxes. A possible conclusion is that environmental 
                                                 
16 See also Marklund (1997). 
 26regulations do not play a decisive role when companies make investment decisions. A more 
recent overview by Brunnermeir and Levinsson (2004) questions this conclusion. They draw 
the conclusion that environmental regulations have a clear impact on a company's site 
location such that polluting industries move to countries with lower environmental 
requirements. 
Tables 3.1 through 3.3 in the Appendix summarize the empirical research that is directly 
related to the Porter hypothesis. The tables attempt to classify the studies in different groups 
based in part on the theoretical discussion in the previous section. The majority of empirical 
research exists within two areas: environmental regulation's effect on investment, innovation 
and R&D (Table 3.1) and environmental regulation's effects on efficiency and productivity 
improvements (Table 3.2). Once again it should be emphasized that the results from these 
tests cannot always be used to make a definitive statement about whether or not the Porter 
hypothesis applies. However, it is possible to say that the Porter hypothesis can be discredited 
in cases where one finds a negative connection between productivity improvement and 
environmental regulation. A third class of studies includes those analyses that specifically 
focus on the connection between some form of profit, or other result measurement, and 
regulation (Table 3.3). In principle, these types of studies can more directly test for the Porter 
hypothesis. 
The summary of studies that analyze the effects of capital accumulation and investment - 
Table 3.1 - does not show any direct support for the Porter hypothesis. Nelson et al. (1993) 
even find that environmental regulations seem to have a negative effect on capital re-
investment in the American electricity production sector, which stands in direct contradiction 
to the "modernizing effects" that were supported in many theoretical explanatory models 
(Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw, 1999). Gray and Shabegian (1998) find that environmental 
investments crowd out productive capital in the American pulp and paper industry. According 
to their study, a 1 percent increase in environmental investment results in a decrease of 1.88 
percent in investment in productive capital. In summary, one can say that there is a lack of 
strong evidence to support the idea that environmental regulations can have some sort of 
positive effect - with respect to Porter - on capital formation and investment. But one should 
be careful about concluding that the Porter hypothesis does not hold because the actual 
environmental regulations discussed were not exactly of the character and type to which 
Porter referred. 
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environmental regulation's effects on R&D expenditures and on the number of successful 
patent applications. Jaffe and Palmer (1997) study the effects of R&D expenditures in the 
American manufacturing industry and measure the strength of environmental regulation in 
terms of outlays on pollution abatement. They find that R&D expenditures increase if the 
outlay on abatement increases, but that the increase is relatively small. Interestingly enough, 
they find that the effects are larger for the petroleum and extraction industry. However, they 
found no significant correlation between environmental regulations (measured as abatement 
costs) and the number of successful patent applications. Brunneheimer and Cohen (2003) use 
a similar approach and find a weak but positive relationship between environmental 
regulations and successful patent applications in the American manufacturing industry. 
Focusing specifically on the abatement of sulphur dioxide (SO2), de Vries and Withagen 
(2005) study the number of successful patents by specifying three models where each relies 
on a different metric to measure environmental regulation. The results are ambiguous. In two 
of the specifications they find a negative correlation between patents and regulations, but for 
the third specification they find a positive correlation. 
Environmental regulation's effects on productivity and efficiency have a relatively long 
history, resulting in a larger number of studies. A summary is provided in Table 3.2. One of 
the first studies, by Gollop and Roberts (1983), found that regulation of sulfur dioxide slowed 
productivity growth in the American electric utility sector by 43 percent in the 1970s. Similar 
results are found in Smith and Sims (1983), Gray (1987), and Barbera and McConell (1990). 
Later studies have, in part, confirmed these results (Gray and Shadbegian, 2003) 
However, there are a few studies that show a somewhat different result. Berman and Bui 
(2001) find that refineries in Southern California - where environmental regulations are quite 
stringent - have had significantly higher productivity than refineries located in other parts of 
the US. Alpay et al. (2002) come to a similar conclusion for the Mexican foodstuff industry 
where productivity increased at the same time that environmental requirements increased. 
Similarly, Hamaoto (2006) finds some support for the idea that environmental regulations 
have had a positive effect on productivity improvements in the Japanese manufacturing 
industry, via positive effects from R&D. In another study van der Vlist et al. (2007) find that 
small and medium-sized companies that voluntarily signed on to an energy-efficiency 
program had better efficiency improvements than the companies that did not participate. The 
fact that the regulation in this latter case is in the form of a voluntary participation makes the 
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rather than a Porter effect. It cannot be excluded that those companies that volunteered are 
companies that anyway would invest in energy-saving capital, or in some manner change their 
production process. To agree to volunteer for such a project may therefore only bring profits - 
not the least goodwill.  
There are also several Scandinavian studies of a similar character. These studies can be 
divided into two categories where the first focuses on different aggregate industries and the 
second focuses on the micro level (i.e., where data exists on the facility or firm level). It is 
predominantly in the later group that the Porter hypothesis is explicitly studied. In the first 
group, Wibe (1986, 1990) focuses an analysis on Sweden, but also includes Finland and 
Denmark. In Wibe (1990) a productivity index is constructed for the Swedish manufacturing 
industry as a ratio between the industry's total value added and the total factor use. In the 
second step, the calculated index is used as a dependent variable in a regression analysis in 
which the dependent variables includes, among others, environmental and labor regulations. 
A problem encountered also in that study is how to quantify regulations adequately. In the 
study, the regulatory pressure is approximated by the number of employees in the relevant 
government authority. Note that the study comprises not only environmental regulations, but 
also labor regulations. The main results of the study are that (1) productivity growth during 
the period 1970-1980 was significantly lower than for the period 1963-1970 and (2) the 
regulation variable (index) did not show any significant correlation with productivity. In the 
same study, Wibe presents a similar analysis for Denmark and Finland. Due to limited access 
to data, the strength of environmental regulation is defined slightly differently in each 
country. As was the case in Sweden, the Danish results do not provide any evidence that 
regulations have a negative impact on productivity improvements. In fact, the results tend to 
indicate some positive effects. The explanation provided is that environmental regulations 
may have a "modernizing effect" of the type discussed in Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999). 
However, in the Finnish analysis the effects were shown to be weakly negative, but 
significant, which would indicate that Finland, like Sweden, does not seem to have any 
modernizing effects. 
Marklund (1997) calculates productivity growth in the Swedish manufacturing industry 
during the period 1974-1993. In general, productivity growth fell during this period. 
However, it is interesting to note that the sectors that are believed to create the largest 
environmental impacts - iron and steel, chemical, pulp and paper - had the most beneficial 
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environmental regulations, which makes it hard to draw any concrete conclusions related to 
correlations between productivity and environmental regulation. 
The other category of Scandinavian studies focused instead on the micro level but also 
differentiate themselves in terms of method and fundamental assumptions. Besides the use of 
firm-level data, these Scandinavian allow for possible Porter effects due to both technology 
development and neutralization of inefficiencies. These studies correspond to the illustration 
of the Porter hypothesis shown in Figure 2.1 which means that these studies allows that 
companies are off the production possibility frontier. The first Scandinavian studies with this 
approach - Hetemäki (1995) and Brännlund (1996) - analyzed the Finnish and Swedish pulp 
and paper industries, respectively. The studies assumed that companies are multi-output 
companies, producing both goods (pulp and paper) and bads (emissions). To represent the 
industry's technology these studies relied on the so-called "distance function", which is able to 
characterize the existing multi-output technology. One of the interesting attributes of the 
distance function, in contrast to the production function, is that it can model multiple-output 
production technologies without the need for specific price data. The benefits of this are 
obvious from an environmental viewpoint. In the case of production involving two products - 
a market-priced good such as paper and a nonmarket-priced bad such as pollution - reliance 
on the distance function seems to provide a superior model because it allows for the 
estimation of a "shadow price" of pollution. The "shadow price" simply measures the change 
in revenues due to the constraint associated with an emissions limit. A negative (positive) 
"shadow price" indicates increased (decreased) costs associated with a more stringent 
environmental policy. Another interesting attribute of this approach - which is in line with 
Porter - is that it precludes having to make the often restrictive assumption that companies 
always maximize profits or minimize costs. In other words, companies are allowed to be 
inefficient. The benefit of the latter is that one can, in principle, study the correlation between 
efficiency and environmental regulations. 
The main result from the Hetemäki (1995) study is that the shadow price on the regulated 
emissions of biological oxygen-demanding agents (BOD)
17 from the Finnish pulp and paper 
industry is negative. That is, regulating the BODs from the Finnish forest-products industry 
                                                 
17 Biological oxygen-demanding agents (BODs) suck oxygen out of the natural water environment, thus leading 
to impacts on marine life and fish spawning. 
 30imposes a cost on firms. One explanation for this could be that the Finish forest-products 
industry chose to address the problem of BOD emissions by constructing a large external 
facility to abate the pollution which, despite the higher investment costs, did not affect the 
production process itself, nor the properties of the final product. Another finding from the 
Hetemäki study was that the companies that were subject to relatively stringent regulatory 
pressure tended to be relatively inefficient companies, while the more efficient companies 
were believed to be subject to relatively less stringent regulatory pressure. 
A further development of the above-named study is found in Marklund (2003) where a similar 
approach was used to measure efficiency that considers both production and estimated 
emissions. In the second step, the analysis applies a regression analysis in order to estimate 
the effects of environmental regulations on the estimated efficiency measurement. The 
analysis, which was performed using data from the Swedish pulp and paper industry, did not 
provide any support for the hypothesis that environmental regulations stimulate efficiency 
improvements. 
Table 3.3 accounts for a number of studies that have examined the correlation between 
environmental regulations and profits (or other type of financial impact). Brännlund et al. 
(1995) for example estimate the costs of regulations designed to reduce emissions of BODs 
and other pollutants from the Swedish pulp and paper industry. The costs were measured as 
the difference in profits between a regulatory scenario and a hypothetical unregulated 
scenario. The results show that for a large percentage of the companies (almost half) profits 
were not affected. For the industry as a whole, however, the regulation imposes a cost. The 
author's interpretation is not that a Porter effect is present, but rather that the current 
regulatory system is not cost-effective in the sense that some companies carry a relatively 
large burden of the industry's total cost reduction. The other studies do not provide any clear 
results. The exception is Filbeck and Gorman (2004) who show a negative correlation 
between environmental regulations and financial impact. King and Lenox (2001) can also be 
mentioned as they come to the opposite conclusion; however their positive correlation 
between regulation and financial impact was weak and insignificant. 
Based on a review of the empirical literature the main conclusion is a lack of strong evidence 
for the existence of a Porter effect. However, it should also be noted that the literature does 
not provide strong evidence against the hypothesis either. The few studies that exist on the 
topic of environmental regulations and investment show that regulations affect both the 
 31investment and modernization of capital stock negatively. Yet, it is also true that evidence 
exists to indicate that environmental regulations affect innovation and R&D positively. But it 
should be repeated here again that any possible positive correlation between environmental 
regulations and innovation (for example measured as the number of successful patent 
applications) does not necessarily mean that a Porter effect exists. Even in the absence of a 
Porter effect one would expect that companies will try to avoid, and reduce the cost of, 
environmental regulations (i.e., avoid the cost of investing in new technology). Regarding the 
correlation between environmental regulation and productivity growth, several studies show 
either a negative or insignificant relationship. The studies that examine the correlation 
between environmental regulation and financial impacts do not in themselves provide any 
support for or against the Porter hypothesis. 
In summary, we can say that the fundamental question of whether or not the Porter hypothesis 
is in fact applicable is still unanswered. What we can say based on a review of the theoretical 
and empirical literature is that a generally positive correlation between environmental 
regulations and competitiveness does not exist, but that this type of correlation can occur 
under specific circumstances. The fact that the question cannot be answered definitively based 
on the existing research is presumably the result of several different factors. The most 
important factor is perhaps that existing studies are unable to apply a formal hypothesis test to 
Porter's idea, at least in part because there is no general consensus about what should be 
tested. Other factors include the problems of measurements and definitions; namely, what we 
mean by the term "competitiveness" and how it can be measured and what we mean by the 
term "environmental regulation" and how it can be measured. 
It is interesting to note that most studies do not clearly differentiate between regulatory 
measures or instruments, despite the fact that Porter is relatively clear that only specific types 
of regulations can actually neutralize the initial costs. Perhaps a more successful approach 
might be to try and separate regulations into different groups or categories and then analyze 
the differences in effects.  
The overall policy conclusion that can be made from the theoretical and empirical review is 
that it's not possible to show a general Porter effect, i.e., that more stringent environmental 
regulation will lead to a general improvement in competitiveness. It does not mean, however, 
that under some special circumstances we will never find cases where a company experiences 
improved competitiveness following implementation of an environmental policy; in fact, the 
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der Linde, 1995). But this does not mean that we can design environmental policy based on 
these specific cases that are observed ex post because (1) we cannot identify these cases ex 
ante and (2) because these cases may arise for reasons other than environmental regulation. 
Instead, environmental policy must take as a starting point the environmental problem itself, 
as well as the expected costs (ex ante) associated with a company's adaptation and/or 
investment. If instead the estimates of these costs are based on unique cases under special 
circumstances, it can lead to a credibility problem for environmental policy which, in turn, 
can have dire consequences for the implementation of important environmental policy 
measures in the future. 
3.2.1 The Swedish case: some recent evidence 
Sweden has to a large extent been forerunner in environmental policy, especially in 
introducing policy instruments that seems to fulfill the criteria necessary for a Porter effect, 
according to Porter. Here we will present and discuss some empirical results for Sweden from 
two recent studies performed on both long-run, historical aggregate data, and firm level data 
(Brännlund, 2008, and Brännlund and Lundgren, 2008). The first study focuses on 
productivity measures and environmental regulatory pressure in general, while the second 
study focus on especially the CO2 tax which came into effect in 1991 and its effects on firm-
level profitability. 
Brännlund (2008) is to evaluate the potential effects on productivity development in the 
Swedish manufacturing industry due to changes in environmental regulations over a long time 
period, 1913 to 1999. A two stage model is used were the total factor productivity is 
calculated in the first stage over the whole period, which is then used in a second stage as the 
dependent variable in a regression analysis where one of the independent variables is a 
measure of environmental regulatory intensity. 
The results show that the productivity growth has varied considerably over time. The least 
productive period was the Second World War period, whereas the period with the highest 
productivity growth was the period after the Second World War until 1970. Development of 
emissions, in this case carbon and sulphur, follows essentially the same path as productivity 
growth until 1970. After 1970, however, there is a decoupling in the sense that emissions are 
decreasing, both in absolute level and as emissions per unit of value added. 
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Concerning the relationship between regulations and productivity growth, a rather robust 
conclusion is that there is no clear relationship, given the regulatory measure used. One 
explanation is that the effect actually does not exist, or that it is too small to be measured 
compared to other factors affecting productivity growth. Another potential explanation is that 
the measure used does not capture actual regulations in a correct way. A tentative conclusion, 
though, is that the part of the Porter hypothesis that asserts that the right kind of regulations 
enhances productivity can be rejected. 
 
The objective of Brännlund and Lundgren (2008) is to evaluate the potential effects on 
Swedish manufacturing industry in terms of input demand, output and profits of the Swedish 
CO2 tax regime that started 1991. More specifically the objective is to test the Porter 
hypothesis, i.e. whether environmental regulations (the right kind), that usually is associated 
with costs, triggers mechanisms that enhances efficiency and productivity that finally may 
outweigh the initial cost increase. To test the hypothesis an econometric partial equilibrium 
model
18 is developed for the Swedish industrial sector which relies on firm-level data from 
1990 to 2004. The model deviates from the standard setting by allowing for a kind of a firm 
level, environmental policy induced technological progress, in the sense that the changes in 
the CO2 tax is allowed to affect productivity through changes in technological progress.
19 
Thus, given this particular set up the model, apart from providing standard static estimates of 
supply and demand elasticities, allows us to test for a more potential dynamic effect due to the 
tax effect on productivity.  
The basic structure of the model is based on standard microeconomic foundations, assuming 
that each firm (i) maximizes profits, (ii) operates in a competitive environment, and (iii) has a 
technology that transforms inputs to a single good output, but also produces a bad output in an 
efficient way. Assumption (i) implies, among other things, that given an output decision, each 
firm will choose a bundle of inputs that minimizes costs. Assumption (ii) implies that all input 
and output prices are exogenous to the firm. Assumption (iii) implies that we can describe the 
                                                 
18 They use a slightly modified version of the econometric model in Brännlund and Lundgren (2007). 
19 The seminal reference on endogenous technological change is Romer (1990). For general discussions and 
reviews on environmental policy and endogenous technical change from a national level perspective see, e.g., 
Goulder and Schneider (1999), Jaffe et al. (2002), Gillingham et al (2007), or Peretto (2008).  
 34technology with a production function. Apart from this standard set-up we add a technological 
progress component that may shift the profit function. The novelty in this study is that the 
technological progress component is a function of the actual payment of carbon dioxide tax 
for each firm. 
Thus, the effect on profit due to an increase in the CO2 tax has two potential effects; a direct 
cost effect, through a price increase in fossil fuels, and an indirect effect due to a change in 
technological progress, via transformational pressure due to the tax. For a Porter effect to 
exist the indirect effect must be higher than the direct cost effect. 
The results show that the direct tax effect, via the price, is negative for all sectors, as expected 
since it corresponds to a direct increase in costs. The tax effect via technical change is 
significantly negative for most of the sectors. An exception is the rubber and plastic industry 
in which the effect is significantly positive. Furthermore, for the mining (non-iron) industry it 
seems as if the tax has no effects on profit via technical change. Looking at broader 
aggregates, the energy intensive and the non-energy intensive industries, reveal that the tax 
effect via technical change is positive, although not significant different from zero, for the non 
energy intensive industry, whereas it is significantly negative for the energy-intensive 
industry. Thus it can be concluded that the necessary condition for a positive porter effect is 
fulfilled only for the rubber and plastic industry. For all other sectors, and the industry as a 
whole, we find no evidence that the CO2 tax has lowered the cost via productivity 
improvements. One explanation to this may be that different sectors in the industry are subject 
to different kind of exemptions from the tax. The CO2 tax fluctuates more over time for the 
non-energy intensive industry. More importantly, the right tail of the price distribution has 
become larger over time for the non-energy intensive industry, compared to the energy 
intensive industry. That is, more firms that belong to the non-energy industry have been faced 
with a higher CO2 price over time, compared to firms in the energy intensive sector. This may 
have led to a more significant cost pressure on firms that are not subject to exemptions. In 
summary, it may be the case that energy intensive industry has been more or less unaffected 
of increases in the nominal CO2 tax, whereas non energy intensive industries have not. 
It should also be stressed that the results presented do not imply that there is no positive 
productivity development in the manufacturing industry due to an increase in the CO2 tax. 
Rather they imply that the productivity development that occurs is independent or slowed 
down through the indirect tax effect. Thus a negative tax effect may be interpreted as a 
 35crowding out effect; i.e., a higher tax, which may or may not lead to an improvement in 
energy efficiency, is crowding out other potential productivity improvements.  
6. Conclusions and directions for future research 
Here we will provide a summary of our findings, and provide some modest guidance for 
future research.  
The main purpose of this paper has been to highlight, review and analyze the so-called Porter 
hypothesis, i.e., the idea that more stringent environmental regulations give rise to benefits 
(other than environmental improvement or environmental protection) that not only reduce the 
initial cost of the environmental policy, but can off-set the cost or even lead to the realization 
of "extra profits." More specifically, the purpose has been to give a systematic review of the 
so-called Porter hypothesis. We can also say that the purpose was to relate the Porter 
hypothesis - or more specifically the "well-designed" requirement placed upon environmental 
policy by Porter - to the more conventional or neoclassical view on choice of instrument 
within environmental policy.  
When considering the universe of instruments available to policy makers, economic 
instruments in the form of taxes and transferrable permits are generally believed to have an 
advantage, relative to other types of instruments, with regard to cost-effectiveness. That is, 
these types of measures provide policy-makers with the best approach to reach a given 
environmental goal at the lowest cost. Economic instruments give clear incentives for cost-
saving and stimulate technological innovation, thus ensuring dynamic efficiency in the long 
run. In other words, if one selects the right type of instrument then some of the costs - i.e., 
those that might arise from choosing the "wrong" instrument - may be partly neutralized.  
Based on the literature review conducted in this study we can draw three robust conclusions. 
The first is that very special assumptions are required to affirm the validity of the Porter 
hypothesis, including how companies and markets function and how they are organized. The 
second conclusion is that the Porter hypothesis requires not only the presence of an 
environmental problem but also some additional market imperfection that can be neutralized 
or alleviated through the environmental regulation. In simple terms, we must have two 
problems that can be addressed with one measure or, to use a crude analogy, we must be able 
to "kill two birds with one stone." The literature review also pointed to the mechanisms that 
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If policy-makers select the right type of instrument, companies will search for the cheapest 
solution to the problem. In some special circumstances it may lead to a case where companies 
have lower costs then before the instrument was implemented, but in the majority of cases this 
will imply a cost. The third conclusion is that the Porter effect should not be considered in any 
ex ante calculation of costs arising from proposed environmental policy.  
When looking specifically at the Swedish case, empirical results suggests that value added 
increased by a factor 12 since 1913, while the emissions of sulphur and carbon dioxide had a 
similar development up to the 70s, when there was a clear break in the trend. The level of 
emissions of sulphur and carbon dioxide are today at the same level as in 1913, even though 
the industry now contributes 12 times the value added to GDP. In other words, environmental 
efficiency has increased steadily during the past century. The analysis, however, show no 
significant relationship between environmental regulations and productivity, neither it seem to 
be any contradiction between high growth and improved environment. The results from 
studying the Swedish industry on firm level and the effect of a CO2 tax (imposed 1991) 
between the years 1990 and 2004 also fails to support the Porter hypothesis, with the 
exception of the Rubber and Plastic sector. A higher CO2 tax does lead to higher energy 
efficiency, but other negative productivity effects dominate. The overall negative “tax effect” 
could be interpreted as a crowding out effect. 
Cost-free environmental policy? The answer to this question, which was asked in the title of 
this review, cannot be anything other than “probably not”. The possibility of "extra profits" 
that neutralize or even exceed the initial cost of regulation should not be expected. This is the 
"take-home" message of this review. It does not mean that we cannot find a firm that "wins" 
from regulation, but it does mean that such a situation would be the exception rather than the 
rule. Nor does it mean that we should avoid stringent environmental policies or leave weak 
policies in place. To the contrary, policy-makers should focus their energy on setting relevant 
environmental goals and selecting the most effective instruments and, most importantly, 
weighing the expected costs against the expected environmental profits of individual 
regulations. This conclusion is not particularly controversial, especially when we view a 
"clean environment" as a good that is "produced" and thus demands resources. The resources 
demanded for our "environmental good" could, of course, have been used to produce another 
type of good demanded by society, and this is the cost of obtaining a clean environment. 
Thus, this conclusion is based on the principle that, considering the economy as a whole over 
 37the long-term, there are no free resources lacking an alternative use. 
The discussion above opens up for several options concerning future research. Perhaps the 
most interesting, and urgent research direction is to model the technological progress as part 
of an adjustment process taking dynamics, environmental policy, and environmental 
performance, explicitly into account.  
Two research areas that seem to be increasingly relevant to the Porter hypothesis, and could 
motivate future theoretical and empirical research efforts, are bounded rationality and 
behavioral economics.
20  
In behavioral economics the basic point is that in an increasingly large number of cases it has 
become clear that people, or in the case of the Porter hypothesis the managers of the firms, do 
not move from the status quo even when it is in their best interest to do so (see e.g. Shogren et 
al., 2008, Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988, or Kahneman et al., 1991). Hence, in these 
circumstances, regulations that force the changes could actually lead to enhanced efficiency 
and increased competitiveness. In the context of Porter’s argumentation, there is a need to 
investigate and study this further in future research. 
In some energy efficiency studies it is shown that bounded rationality (see e.g. Simon, 1982, 
or Khaneman, 2003) seems to characterize decision-making in some cases. Simon (1982) 
suggests that economic agents employ the use of heuristics to make decisions rather than a 
strict rigid rule of optimization. They do this because of the complexity of the situation, and 
their inability to process and compute the expected utility of every alternative action. 
Deliberation costs might be high and there are often other economic activities where similar 
decision making is required. For example, Stern and Aronson (1984) noted that routines are 
rather commonly substituted for rigorous decision-making. These routines, such as replacing 
a depreciated piece of equipment with the same brand and type, may economize on the time 
and effort spent searching for the best product or strategy, but they can lead (and have led) to 
substantial biases against energy efficiency when technologies are rapidly changing.  
                                                 
20 We thank Editor T. Tietenberg for pointing us to these two relevant areas for future research. 
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Table 3.1 Empirical studies of the effect of regulations on innovation (R&D) and investment 
Study  Purpose and Method  Data  Results 
Nelson et al. (1993)  A simultaneous three-
equation model where the 
variables (a) age of capital 
stock, (b) emissions and 
(c) costs of regulation 
depend upon each other 
Two measures of 
environmental regulations: 
(1) costs of abatement for 
air emissions and (2) total 
abatement costs 
44 electric utilities in the 
US, 1969-1983 
Environmental 
regulations increase the 
age of capital stock 
The age of capital stock 
has no significant effect 
on emissions 
Regulations have an 
effect on emission levels 
Jaffe and Palmer 
(1997) 
Innovation and technology 
development is 
approximated with the 
level of R&D investment 





approximated by the cost 
of pollution abatement  
Panel data for the 
American manufacturing 
industry, 1973-1991  
 
Model of reduced form 
with industry-specific 
effects. 
A significant positive 
correlation between R&D 
and environmental 
regulations (cost of 
abatement) 
 
No significant correlation 
between environmental 
regulation and patent 
applications. 
Gray and Shadbegian 
(1998) 
Modeled the choice of 
technology (multinomial 
logit) and investments in 
American pulp and paper 
industry 
Environmental regulations 
approximated by (a) % of 
state congressmen that 
voted for environmental 
regulation and (b) strength 
of air and water regulation 
index  
Panel data for 116 
American paper 
companies, 1972-1990. 
Choice of technology 
affects environmental 
regulations 
Negative effect of 
environmental regulation 
on investments 
Productive investment is 
reduced considerably 







by the number of approved 
environmentally-related 
patent applications  
Environmental regulation 
approximated by the cost 
of abatement and the 
number of environmental 
inspectors 
Panel data of 146 
American manufacturing 
industries, 1983-1992 
Model of reduced form 
with industry-specific 
effects 
Small positive effect of 
abatement costs on the 
number of approved 
patents 
Increased enforcement of 
activities related to 
existing regulations have 
no positive effects on 
innovation 
Innovation is more likely 
 45in industries that are 
highly competitive on 
international markets 
De Vries and 
Withagen (2005) 
Innovation approximated 
by the number of approved 
patent applications related 
to abatement of sulfur 
dioxide 
Environmental regulations 
approximated in three 
different ways: (a) 
international agreements 
with respect to sulphur 
emissions, (b) an index of 
regulatory strength and (c) 
as a latent variable. 
Country data for Europe 
and North American (US 
and Canada), 1970-2000 
Two of the models show 
a negative correlation 
between patent 
applications and 
regulations, while the 
third shows a positive 
correlation. 
 
Table 3.2 Empirical studies of the effect of regulations on efficiency and productivity 
improvements 
Study  Purpose and method  Data  Results 
Gollop and Robert 
(1983) 
productivity measurement 
derived from cost 
function 
Econometric model of the 





based on actual regulation 
of SO2 and how stringent 
these emissions are 
relative the company's 
unregulated emissions of 
SO2 




have a strong negative 
impact on productivity 
improvement resulting in 
a 43% decline in 
productivity growth. 
Smith and Sims (1983)  Productivity measurement 
derived from the cost 
function 
Econometric model of the 
cost function which 
includes environmental 
regulations 
Two facilities (brewery) 
subject to an emissions 
fee, while two other 
facilities not subject to the 
Four Canadian breweries, 
1971-1980 
The average productivity 
growth was 0.08% in the 
regulated entities and 
+1.6% in the unregulated 
entities 
 46fee 
Gray (1987)  Total factor productivity 
as the dependent variable 
in a regression with, 
among others, abatement 













Barbera and McConnell 
(1990) 
Derivation of direct 
effects (abatement costs) 
and indirect effects (via 
other inputs and 
production) on 
productivity as a result of 
environmental 
regulations, based on the 
cost function 
Five American emission-
intensive industry sectors 
(paper, chemical, 
agriculture, stone and 
glass, iron and steel, and 
metal industry), 1960-
1980 
Decline in productivity in 
every sector following 
more stringent abatement 
requirements (10-50%). 
Indirect effects also 
contributed to decline, 
except in non-iron ore 
mines  
Wibe (1990)  Analysis of the effects on 
productivity of labor 
regulations in the Swedish 




regulations measured by 
the number of employees 
at the environmental 
agencies 
Sector-specific data for 
the Swedish industry 
1963-1980 
No significant correlation 
between productivity and 
regulations 
Hetemäki (1995)  Estimate of shadow price 
of emissions from the 




Facility data for the 
Finnish pulp and paper 
industry 
Emission reductions 
constitute a cost for 
companies 
Brännlund (1996)  Estimate of the shadow 
price of emissions from 





Facility data for the 
Swedish pulp and paper 
industry 
Negative shadow price on 
emission of BOD agents 
in waterbodies 
 
Emissions reductions of 
BOD agents is associated 
with costs 
Marklund (1997)  Estimated productivity 
improvement in Swedish 
industry 
Branch data for Swedish 
industry, 1974-1993 
In general productivity 
fell during this period 
 





 47Dufour et al (1998)  Total factor productivity 
as the dependent variable 
in a regression with, 
among others, percentage 
of costs for abatement 









Boyd and McClelland 
(1999) 
Estimate and analysis of 
total factor productivity in 
the American pulp and 
paper industry 
Distance function 
approach that allows for 
the estimate of 
inefficiency in both 
resource use and 
production, including 
"production" of emissions 
Facility-specific data for 
American integrated pulp 
and paper factories, 1988-
1992 
Emission and resource 
consumption can be 




reduce production by 9%, 
of which 25% is the result 
of requirements for 
pollution abatement 
equipment 
Berman and Bui (2001)  Comparison of 
productivity improvement 
in refineries in Southern 
California (stringent 
regulations) and rest of 




Companies in Southern 
California exhibited more 
productivity growth and 
higher abatement costs. 




Alpay, Buccola and 
Kerkvliet (2002) 
Productivity growth in the 
Mexican and American 
foodstuff industry. An 
econometric model based 
on the profit function that 
includes abatement costs 
(US) or frequency of 
environmental inspection 
(Mexico) 
Mexican and American 
foodstuff industry, 1962-
1994 
In the US negligible 
effects of environmental 
regulation in the US both 
on profits and 
productivity 
 
In Mexico negative 
effects of environmental 
regulation (inspection) on 
profits, but positive 
effects on productivity 
growth 
Gray and Shadbegian 
(2003) 
Total factor productivity 
in the American paper 
industry as a function of, 
among others, abatement 
costs 
 
Econometric estimate of 
production function that 
includes cost of 
abatement capital 
American paper industry, 
1979-1990 
Strong significant 
negative effect of 
environmental regulation 
on productivity 
Marklund (2003)  Analysis of the effect of 
environmental regulations 
on efficiency in the 




regulations measured as 
the actual regulation of 
Facility-specific data for 
Swedish paper industry 
1983-1990 
No significant correlation 
between strength of 
regulation and efficiency 
 48emissions of BOD agents 
to waterbodies 
Hamamoto (2006)  Analysis of regulation's 
effects on efficiency, 
R&D expenditure, and the 




measured as abatement 
expenditures  
Sector-specific data for 










expenditures and the 






expenditures on R&D 




Examines the difference 
in productivity growth 
between companies that 




where companies are 
allowed to be inefficient 
(i.e., not on the 
production frontier)  
Panel data for Holland's 
horticulture industry 
Medium and small 
companies, 1991-1999 
Voluntary agreement to 
reduce environmental 
impacts is (on average) 






and voluntary agreements 
depends upon the type of 




Table 3.3 Empirical studies of the effect of regulations on profits and/or other financial 
impacts 
Study  Purpose and method  Data  Results 
Brännlund and Liljas 
(1993) 
Analysis of the effect of 
environmental regulations 
on the Swedish pulp and 
paper industry 
Strength of environmental 
regulation derived from 
actual environmental 
regulations 
Profit function with 
environmental regulations 
treated as a separate 
argument 
Facility-specific data for 
Swedish pulp and paper 
industry, 1986-1990 
Some evidence that more 
stringent regulations have 
negative effects on 
company profits 
 
However, no clear answer 
because not all tests show 
a significant effect 
Brännlund et al. (1995)  Regulation's effects on 
profits in the Swedish 
41 Swedish pulp and 
paper companies, 1989-
Regulations reduce profits 




that estimates profits 
under different 
regulations 
1990 Two-thirds  of  companies 
are believed to be 
unaffected, i.e., neither 
negatively nor positively  
Khanna et al. (1998)  Analysis of share 
performance following 
the public release of 
information about a 
company's emissions of 
dangerous substances 
 
Regression model with 
panel data designed to 
identify abnormal stock 
returns 
91 American chemical 
companies, 1989-1994 
Abnormally low share 
return the day after 
information is made 
public 
 
Abnormally poor share 
return is more common 
for companies that fail to 
reduce emissions 
Dasgupta and Laplante 
(2001) 
Analysis of profit growth 
following special events 
such as (a) investment in 
new pollution abatement 
equipment and (b) 
negative environmental 
news (e.g., complaints, 
emissions, etc) 
126 events that affected 
48 companies in 
Argentina, Chile, The 
Philippines, and Mexico  
20 of 39 positive events 
lead to positive profits 
(greater than normal 
profits) 
33 of 85 negative events 
led to abnormally low 
profits 
King and Lenox (2001)  Analysis of Tobin's Q, 
where Q value is 
explained by, among 
others, a company's 
environmental impact and 
environmental regulations 
 
Tobin's Q measured as a 
company's market value 
divided by the value of its 
assets 
 
Strength of environmental 
regulation approximated 
by (1) the number of 
emission permits required 
and (2) the average 
emissions within industry 
and individual US states, 
respectively 
Panel data for 652 
American manufacturing 
companies, 1987-1996 
Positive effect of 
environmental regulations 
on financial results, but 




between financial results 
and environmental 
impacts 
Filbeck and Gorman 
(2004) 
Effects of environmental 
regulations on financial 
results 
24 American electric 
power plants, 1996-1998 
Negative correlation 
between profits and 
environmental regulations 
Gupta and Goldar (2005)  Analysis of profit growth 
following public release 
of environmental ranking 
 
Environmental ranking 
based on the "best 
possible technology" 
17 Indian pulp and paper 
industry companies, 15 
Indian car companies, and 
18 Indian chemical 
companies, 1999-2001 
Negative correlation 
between profits and 
environmental ranking 
 